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The August 2019 Maputo Accord on Peace and Reconciliation appears not to be standing on entirely solid ground. Not only has the decentralization agreement suffered from last minute ‘adulteration’, but also the DDR process has been lacking speed and rigour. The circumstances and outcomes of the October 2019 elections have cast doubt on the extent to which Renamo will abide to the August 2019 agreement. The party appears to be split on the matter of the – officially disowned armed Junta Militar maintaining low-intensity, nevertheless deadly, attacks on civilian traffic in central Mozambique. Thus it remains doubtful at the beginning of 2020 to what extent the ambitious DDR process, the key Pillar/Provision of the most recent peace agreement, may be implemented and by when. Further, the institutional setup of the Peace Secretariat and the donor-financed MDTF for DDR process leave doubts about national ownership of and responsibility for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which uses reconciliation as a token, but avoids getting to its substance. Apart from these factors, the summary amnesty legislation benefitting both former warring parties prevents the possibility of publicly discussing justice and pursuing war crimes. With Frelimo’s impressive, albeit amply contested, win of the 2019 elections at the national level and provincial tier of government, the paradigm of ‘winner takes all’ may come back into political reality, which in the past had triggered armed conflict and prompted political negotiations on some degree of power sharing through decentralization arrangements. In some senior political circles, this paradigm is now paraphrased as the introduction of a benevolent authoritarian African regime, at the cost of democratic checks and balances and a strong civil society. Under these circumstances, reconciliation initiatives as sketched above , primarily promoted by civil society in the broadest sense and including FBOs, would seem a viable strategy to breathe new life into the August 2019 agreement and opening space for the youth to actively engage the political parties which, up to today, they had talked peace but remained prepared for war. Only Chissano, in the aftermath of the Rome General Peace Accord, attempted to ‘walk the reconciliation talk’. The present constellation and the terrible consequences for lives and livelihoods in Cabo Delgado would also represent a strategic opportunity to become actively involved in peace consolidation, from which the Mozambican CSOs have been kept at a distance, leaving peace-making to political leaders only. A Malawian proverb suggests that he who thinks he is leading but has no followers is only taking a walk.

OCLC: 1164631287